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Abstract
The paper intends to explore the strength of individual and group agency in the scope of Portuguese overseas expan-
sion at a global level. It further seeks to emphasise the mechanisms of cooperation, both between European agents
and between those and local agents and authorities, sometimes led even against the interests of the Portuguese
crown. Finally it argues that the success of these contacts depended more often than not on an active process of ac-
culturation and miscegenation, rather than on imposition mechanisms, traditionally regarded as the lever of colonial
and empire building processes.
To discuss the evidence underlying these assumptions, it focus on the Portuguese case, fi rst at a general level,
then from a micro-approach centred on the Jesuit enactments in Japan and their interaction with trade networks in
the Pacifi c Ocean.
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1. Theoretical Framework. New theories on empire building
European historiography usually associates the analysis of globalisation in the Early Modern Period (1500–1800)
with “empire building” processes, considering overseas expansionism led by the Portuguese, Spanish, Dutch,
British and French as the main lever in the process, disregarding proposals that argue in favour of an increasing
pre-globalisation dynamics in the Indian Ocean1), long before the arrival of Europeans.
Furthermore, the study of the historical outcomes of early modern empires is usually focused on central power 
strategies and imperial rivalries, monopolies, warfare strategies and political disputes between colonisers. This
perspective leads to three main consequences:
1. Focusing on central power strategies, they exclude the perception of how individuals and groups of indi-
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viduals contributed to those historical dynamics, at times to an even greater extent than the central power 
itself.
2. The few existing analyses based on networks deal mostly with institutionalised, formal connections,
whether they were political, religious or economic, excluding those acting within an informal and non-
institutionalised scope.
3. They disregard the active infl uence of the agents, societies and civilizations of contact, in Africa, Asia and 
America, ignoring local inputs to colonial dynamics.
Even though a relevant number of studies may have already gone beyond this perception with regard to Asia,
and particularly the Indian Ocean, among which we can mention the works of Sanjay Subrahmanyam2), Michael
Pearson3), or James Boyajian4), much has yet to be done. Such perspectives5) are in fact under review in more recent 
times, through the lens of a dynamic historiography, both European and non-European. The expression “informal
empires”6) has even arisen, as a means to point out the informal ways in which the European overseas dominium
was built in the First Global Age.
Simultaneously, networks became a central concept, and network reconstitution methods a core procedure
in the analysis of Early Modern globalisation. More than formal networks, researchers focus their attention on
informal, trans-imperial and cross-border networks, rather than on those resulting from the enactments of central
power strategies, which are, by nature, national, and promote rivalry rather than cooperation. The reasoning to this
is clear and can be checked in a panel proposal to the ESSHC of Glasgow (April 2012), according to which: “…
there is a growing consensus that most of the European empires overseas were profi table and successful due to
the intervention of individuals or groups of individuals engaged in the common good of the social and economic
networks they served. More often than not, these self-organized, trans-imperial, cross-cultural networks imposed 
serious challenges to State, Church and Monopolistic institutions, since they were the source of most of the illegal
and contraband transactions world-wide, but they were also the ones that within, or in collaboration with the institu-
tions actually became agents of empire building”7).
This paper falls in line with this developing tendency of historiographical revision, in which Francesca
Trivellato’s The Familiarity of Strangers8); Studnicky’s work on Portugal’s Atlantic Diaspora9) or Lamikiz’s re-
search on Spanish merchants and overseas networks10), set the tone.
Our study also follows the path set in a recent historiographical approach, deriving from inputs from theories
on cooperation when applied to History, currently developed by an international and interdisciplinary research
project—DynCoopNet, submitted to the European Science Foundation’s TECT (The Evolution of Cooperation and 
Trade) programme. As for the theoretical background, DynCoopNet (“Dynamic Complexity of Cooperation-Based 
Self-Organizing Commercial Networks in the First Global Age”)11) applies the evolutionary models and theories
of cooperation to historical studies. From a methodological point of view, it is based on the operative principles of 
network analysis and agent-based modelling.
This project sustains that, in the period between the 15th and 18th centuries, the world economy was increas-
ingly characterised by widespread collaboration that went beyond the boundaries of countries and continents. It 
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further argues that it was made possible by new means of global communication and the building not only of formal
but also informal networks, frequently multinational. Among the primary assumptions of this project, some can be
highlighted:
1. Cooperation tied together several self-organizing networks;
2. The world economy became, at this period, a dynamic, open, complex, non-linear system;
3. The history of any place within this world cannot be understood without examining how it was connected 
to other locations and to the system as a whole12).
These connections, at a global level, were mainly sustained by the agency of informal and self-organised 
networks, rather than by the offi cial operations of formal agents of empire building, whether monopolistic trade
companies or state institutions and representatives.
According to DynCoopNet, cooperation-based self-organising networks were characterised by a diffusion
of authority; these cooperation-based networks served as a source for the creativity and innovation necessary to
respond in a fl exible manner to the disruptions in commodity, information, and capital fl ows; there were signifi cant 
variations in cooperative behaviour, and these were shaped by cultural information, institutions and individual
agents, that can be specifi c to place and that vary according to the circuits used by political, commercial and social
networks13).
The strategy and work plan of this research programme, aiming to ascertain the agency of self-organising
commercial networks over various temporal scales, presents itself as a major tool to re-evaluate worldwide dynam-
ics from a new perspective, centred on individuals. However, to fully understand the mechanisms of cooperation,
it is important to acknowledge that cooperation does not take place only among individuals or informal networks.
Individual actors and informal networks do not always act against formal powers, against the crown or the state.
Cooperation between individuals and the state is often a decisive means of empire building. Summarising our point 
of view, the role of the Modern State in the construction of European empires is undeniable. The constitution of 
overseas empires, in terms of administrative control and military organisation, required complex logistics and sub-
stantial fi nancial capacity, which was inaccessible to individuals or isolated groups. However, the complex systems
produced and coordinated by the central powers often depended on cooperation from individuals.
The construction of global interactions, based on self-organising networks becomes, thus, essential to the un-
derstanding of some dynamics that transcended political, religious and economic frontiers, which are in fact, those
which sustain globalisation processes. Furthermore, cooperative behaviours among individuals and the state did 
not exclude reciprocal behaviours of cheating and desertion. Understanding the mechanisms of cooperation implies
realising that cooperation patterns include different degrees of involvement that go from positive to negative inputs,
from active cooperation to simple collaborations, from dialogue to deception, desertion and active competition, the
latter often regarded as the opposite of cooperation.
According to theoreticians of cooperation, cooperation is described as “a behavior which provides a benefi t 
to another individual and which is selected for because of its benefi cial effect on the recipient”14). Economists’
defi nitions of cooperation focus on two fundamental characteristics. One defi nes cooperation as a collective action
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of individuals who aim to share a certain task, lucrative for all participants15). The other regards cooperation as a
social process where individuals, groups and institutions act in a concerted way to reach common goals. Economic
approaches, in this sense, focus not only on economic characteristics of cooperative relations (cost vs. benefi t), but 
also on the social attributes of partners and their relations16). This behaviour is driven by goals, expectations and 
motivations which imply a collective or dyadic interaction between individuals17). Individual motives and beliefs
are the basis of cooperation, even if the game established has inevitable social implications.
To discuss the evidence underlying these assumptions, we will focus on the Portuguese case, fi rst at a general
level, then from a micro-approach centred on the Jesuit enactments in Japan and their interaction with trade net-
works in the Pacifi c Ocean.
2. The role of state and individuals in the building of of the Portuguese overseas settlements
It is undeniable that the fi rst global routes, involving all the oceans and continents, were made available by
Portuguese and Spanish, as it is undeniable that the Portuguese were the fi rst, in a European context, to initiate this
movement and to create regular maritime routes which made global exchanges at a worldwide level possible.
The evidence and the trends of the Portuguese projection over the world are well known. What is rather un-
known are the reasons, the rationale able to explain both the take-off and the performance of a small, peripheral
country enabling it to take leading positions both in building and in maintaining long term colonial dynamics. Can
all the answers be given by state policies?
It is assumed, with some historiographical consensus, that it was the Portuguese crown that lunched the over-
seas expansion, but is this actually a fact? The conquering of Ceuta, in 1415, for instance, taken by Portuguese
historiography as the fi rst step in Portuguese expansion, was in fact an initiative of King John I. But this episode
is also seen, nowadays, by renowned Portuguese historians as the last episode in the process of the Christian
Reconquest of the Iberian Peninsula, rather than as the fi rst step towards modern geographical expansion and it 
depended, no doubt, on the contributions of individual agents, forced to commit fi nancial, military and naval means
to the operation18).
It has also been proved that some of the processes of geographical discovery, shipping and colonial settlements
were not, in fact, led by central fi gures of the Portuguese monarchy, namely Prince Henry, the so called Navigator,
but resulted from the multiplication of individual initiatives and casuistic achievements, which were to be incorpo-
rated later on in central power strategies. From the fi rst moment, in terms of the models of juridical organisation of 
the colonial spaces, the Portuguese crown often relied on private individuals to whom powers of settlement, military
defence and trade affairs were delegated. The model of hereditary captaincies fi rst implemented in the Atlantic
archipelagos and later in Brazil bears witness to this.
Even when the State sought to politically centralise the administration of overseas territories, as is the case
from 1542, with the establishment of the “Governo Geral” (General Government) in Brazil, or the creation early
on of the “Estado da Índia” (the State of India), it has been proved that these structures were never able to exclude,
or avoid, the informal intervention of private parties.
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The administrative model built up aimed both a monopolistic spice trade system and an effective central con-
trol of all agents travelling to the East—whether they were offi cials, military personnel, adventurers or members
of religious orders. It should provide the State with control over the overall processes taking place from the East 
to the Far East. But it was not what actually took place. A defi nition of Estado da Índia given by Luis Filipe Reis
Thomaz points clearly to the idea that the presence of the Portuguese in the East went far beyond the control of 
the Estado da Índia. According to this author, “The State of India in the 16th century designated not a well-defi ned 
geographical space, but a collection of territories, establishments, assets, individuals and interests that were ad-
ministered, managed or governed by the Portuguese crown in the Indian Ocean and neighbouring seas, and the
coastal territories from the Cape of Good Hope to Japan”19). In general terms, this concept points to the interests
that were offi cially governed by the crown, but it does not coincide nor does it exhaust the much broader notion
of “Portuguese Expansion in the Indian Ocean”, which also covers the non-offi cial modes of settlement, which
developed regardless of the State and, in some cases, even against the State.
The same author stresses the importance of the sub-colonisation phenomena, the creation of colonies from the
main colonies, which escaped central power control, whether in administrative or economic terms. These colonies
proliferated throughout the Indian Ocean, in places like, for example, Pattani (In Southern Siam); Nagapattinan;
Saint Thomas of Mylapore (Coromandel Coast), and most particularly Macau.
It is widely acknowledged that, with regard to Japan, neither the crown nor the vice-royalty had any role in
the expansion and consolidation of the Portuguese presence in that territory, as they did not interfere on the fi nal
outcomes of the process, which ultimately led to the expulsion of the Portuguese from Japan, in 1639, after previous
expulsion edicts of the missionaries, in 161420). The Portuguese crown delegated complete authority to the Jesuits,
on whom the achievement of successful or unsuccessful Portuguese relations with Japan mainly depended, whether 
in religious, political, cultural or commercial terms.
2.1. Portuguese in the East—the role of individuals and informal networks
The availability of contacts and interactions between Europe, particularly Portugal, and the East and Far East 
depended in fact on the regular operation of formal and informal networks connecting those worlds. Among the
formal and institutional Portuguese networks in the East, there are, in the fi rst place, all the administrative, fi nancial
and military structures which represented the State of India, which included a wide range of offi cers, from viceroys,
judges, clerks, bailiffs, captains to tax collectors or notary offi cers. The institutional framework provided by the
missionary activities of the Franciscans, Jesuits, Dominicans, and even Benedictines and, later on, Augustinians,
shouldn’t be forgotten either21). Those organisations, together with the ecclesiastical networks sustained by the
structures of the bishoprics founded in the overseas territories—both integrated in the Portuguese Padroado in the
East, ruled by the Portuguese crown, all provided fl ows of information and goods.
The municipalities, emulating the same model in Portugal, constituted other nodes within a structural network 
responsible for the organisation of the Portuguese presence overseas. Last, but not least, the framework provided 
by the Misericordia Houses, present in the Portuguese colonial settlements, should also be considered22). These
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were civil confraternities which replicated the organization of their metropolitan counterparts. These institutions
provided not only spiritual and social assistance to Portuguese settlers and their descendants, but also provided ways
of transferring news, goods and money.
Besides this framework, providing formal and institutionalised networks, the individual connections among
agents also have to be considered. It is certain that the Crown intended to control all departures from Lisbon to the
East, keeping detailed records. Only individuals licensed by the crown were entitled to travel to India. The law fur-
ther restricted European settlers by acknowledging only three categories of legal residents in Asia: soldiers, casados
(married men, estimated at about two thousand circa 160023)), and clergymen, including priests and missionaries.
In addition, the law established further restrictions on certain groups. It barred all foreigners from Asia and any
persons suspected of unorthodox beliefs, including the Portuguese New Christians, descendants from former Jews
forcefully converted to Christianity. The women were also strictly forbidden from travelling to the East.
The reality was, however, far from that stipulated by the law. With regard to Jews and New Christians, their 
presence in the East, especially in Goa, has been well-documented, from the early decades of the sixteenth century
onwards. The fi rst known reference to fl ows of illegal immigration by New Christians to India dates from 1519
and this phenomenon resulted in the promulgation of crown legislation to control such immigration24). These fl uxes
tended to increase from the 1530s onwards, and available documentation corroborates their geographic dispersal,
including destinations such as Goa, Cochin and Hormuz, as well as Cambay, Bassein, Chaul, Cape Comorin, St.
Thomas of Mylapur, Bengal, Pegu, Tenassarim, Malacca, Siam, the Moluccas and even Japan and China25).
Their number, power and infl uence, especially in the business world, is corroborated by a letter to the king,
dated 1539, from Goa, authored by Dr. Jerónimo Dias, in which he noted: “And they are here in no small numbers
in this city and in Your Highness’ other settlements and fortresses and they are very harmful. Those who are here are
involved in all sorts of contracts and trade and other activities because everything is in their hands. (…) (f.15v). All
these carracks come over here full of those unauthorised and clandestine men. We do not believe that Your Highness
is aware of this because they bribe everyone with gifts and money and bypass all the restrictions that might have
been imposed in these matters by Your Highness”26).
The same can be said about women. Among these women who departed overseas, a clear distinction has to be
made between those who leave under royal orders, or even driven by the crown, and those who do it illegally, in a
surreptitious way. Indeed, women boarding in ships, mostly to India, those from which we have more information,
were targeted, both by civil and religious conviction. The legal constraints can be highlighted by the 1524 Vasco
da Gama resolution, according to which, any woman who was found on board without royal permission, would be
publicly fl ogged and banished to one of the hunting grounds of Africa, even if she was married. In that case, her 
husband would be in irons and forced to return to Portugal and the captains of the ships who did not surrender them
to authorities or should be their accomplices would lose their salaries27).
The restrictions mentioned aim, particularly, the so-called “suspicious women,” those of small virtue, associ-
ated, in the correspondence of the Jesuits, with the practice of concubinacy on board, believed to be responsible for 
disturbances, lack of security, profl igacy of manners, lack of discipline on board and, as such, subject to punish-
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ment. According to such understanding, they were, when it was possible, landed on the scales of the trip. In a letter 
dated 1562, Father Sebastian Gonçalves explains: “The fi rst day we seek to put out the poison that the devil often
introduces to the destruction of the seafarers, so we put out two suspicious women”28).
In this context it is also perceived the statement of Father João Baptista da Ribeira whereby on the journey
that led him to India: “...other three women were on board without a breadwinner husband or anything of good, one
of which in a habit of man (...) We imprisoned them under lock and key, making them a thick box for this purpose.
And so we put it in work, giving the key to a faithful person and fearful of God, (...) that at certain times gave them
something to eat and opened them for some needs...”29).
Although it is not possible to measure, with any accuracy, their proportional presence on board on the differ-
ent maritime runs, both due to the lack of sources, and because of the sub-register practice, being their presence
mostly illegal and disguised, one is allowed to believe that the presence of women on board would be minority,
taken as exceptional and counterproductive, but constant. More so, their performances as colonizers depended on
their prior travel overseas.
Unauthorised individuals, besides those who were sanctioned by the crown, entered thus, the Eastern universe,
cosmopolitan by nature, and the Portuguese authorities barely had control over these fl ows. They acted individually
or in informal networks, often depending on active collaboration with local populations and trade agents. We can
include within this group the “lançados” (so called because they were scattered all over Asia), individuals who left 
Portuguese-controlled settlements to trade freely, or who became mercenaries or renegade mercenaries and corsairs
at the service of neighbouring Muslim states. According to an estimate by Anthony Disney, in the early seventeenth
century, native princes from the Malabar Coast to Bengal employed as many as fi ve thousand “lançados”30).
This was a very mobile population, searching for new opportunities, facing risks and the unknown to achieve
major profi ts. They had a very active role in the building of an active presence in the East and they were in fact 
responsible for some of the fi rst contacts by the Portuguese with the last frontiers of the Eastern world, such as it 
was known to the Portuguese. One of them, Fernão Mendes Pinto, trader, soldier, pirate and adventurer31), is taken
as being responsible for the fi rst contacts with Japan, much as Jorge Álvares, with a very similar profi le, is credited 
as the fi rst Portuguese explorer to have reached China and Hong Kong. They emerge, thus, as active agents of fi rst 
contacts, as much as they are responsible for the permanence of the Portuguese in Asia beyond the Portuguese
empire failure.
Concurrently, it is urgent to recognise that the declining Portuguese dominion in the East was a result of strong
competition from other European powers, as much as of developing local contexts, involving power equilibriums
and economic priorities of Asian landlords. In fact, the interference of new European players was no more than a
catalyst for the strong reaction of local landlords to Portuguese presence and action. The Dutch, French, and British
were as critical to the failure the Portuguese State of India as were the Xá Safavid, the Nayaka kings of Tanjavur 
and Madurai32) or the policies of Toyotomi Hidehoshi or Tokugawa Ieyasu, in Japan. Likewise, the taking of 
Malacca, Ceylon, Cranganor, Negapatam, Cochin, Coulan and Cannanore by the Dutch was no more decisive for 
the withdrawal of the Portuguese Estado da India than the loss of Ormuz, to the Xá Abbas, in 1622, or the loss of 
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Siriam (1612), Hugli (1632), or the Canara ports (1654), or, likewise, the loss of Nagasáki and the fi nal expulsion
of the Portuguese from Japan, in 1639.
Additionally, the Portuguese crown’s loss of dominion in the East and Far East did not correspond to an
equivalent loss of protagonism on the part of Portuguese agents: their presence was still resilient in the Malabar 
Coast, the Bay of Bengal and in the Far East. The Portuguese restored their presence in the Coromandel Coast, dur-
ing the 17th century in Porto Novo (New Port), trying to circumvent the loss of Nagapattinan to the Dutch. In San
Thomas of Millipore, a Portuguese community was offi cially reassembled, after the loss of the settlement, as well
as in Hugli, where Portuguese presence is, again, noticed in 1660. The same pattern seems to have replicated, for 
instance, in Ayutthaya, in Siam, where in 1684 an organised community was still in place, maintaining their pres-
ence, and guidance by Jesuit priests, despite the successive ruling presence of the Dutch, British and French.
A statement by one of the administrators of VOC to the rulers of the United Provinces in 1658, upon the taking
of Ceylon, summarises the Dutch perception of this resilience: “The greater number regard India as their father-
land, thinking no longer of Portugal; they trade thither little or not at all, living and enriching themselves out of the
treasures of India, as though they were natives and knew no other fatherland.”33) This deserves a comment from
Charles Corn, the author of “The Scents of Eden”: “Despite having been ousted from the Spice Islands and losing
their monopoly to the Dutch, the Portuguese were scattered in pockets throughout Asia. (…) the Portuguese (…)
were unique among European colonizers of the Far East in their ability to involve themselves deeply in the social
and cultural lives of the Asian peoples among whom they did retain a foothold (…). Ironically, if any European
tongue was the language of merchant intercourse, even in Batavia, it was Portuguese, much to the displeasure of 
the Dutch, who had overridden the Portuguese in matters of trade but made little effort to regard local cultures
sympathetically.”34)
Regardless of the reasons, it is undeniable that disappearance of Portuguese offi cial presence in the East in the
17th century did not apply, to the same extent, to the Portuguese agents. Their skills as intermediaries, as translators,
and their knowledge of trade circuits, monetary systems, political systems and cultural backgrounds were, in fact, of 
signifi cant value for local rulers and European invaders. The role of the Portuguese “casados”, men who had been
encouraged by offi cial policies to marry local women, is widely acknowledged as an essential element of permanent 
settlement and as factor of rootedness.
The resilient presence of the Portuguese in Macau and in Timor throughout the 17th and 18th centuries, right in
the core of Dutch and British infl uence, only provides additional proof of the availability of Portuguese agents, as
individuals, to maintain their networks of trade and the capacity for cooperation, regardless of the rulers in place.
This led us, again, to the discussion of the performance of self-organised networks. These networks were not cre-
ated after the loss of Portuguese primacy in the Eastern world. They were already in place during the golden age
of the State of India.
The difference between the power of the State of India, its institutions and representatives and that of private
entrepreneurs can be sustained with fi nancial indicators. Several fi nancial contributions were repeatedly imposed 
on Portuguese municipalities and particularly on the Goa city council, in order to prepare royal armadas and armies
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for the defence of the State of India, in the late 16th and the 17th centuries. Likewise, private loans were requested 
from and provided by local entrepreneurs and businessmen in Goa, at a time when the offi cial budget of the State of 
India was depleted and the representatives of the Portuguese crown were unable to respond with military resources
to the attacks, both from European competitors and local landlords35). In fact, during the 17th century, in times of 
declared crisis, it seems clear that the depletion and bankruptcy of the royal treasury did not in any way correspond 
to the situation of the private entrepreneurs. As it seems, while the offi cial presence of the Portuguese crown in the
Indian and the Pacifi c Oceans was collapsing, from the end of the 16th century onwards, private business, even when
led by crown representatives, kept running successfully, going as far as to deal with those who were formal enemies
of the Portuguese crown. This led us to our main focus of discussion: the importance of individual initiatives and 
self-organised and informal networks as a main factor of globalisation.
2.2. Self-organised trade networks in the Portuguese Eastern emporium
Portuguese and European historiography describes Portugal’s commercial expansion as based on monopolistic
strategies led by the crown. It is, in fact, true that the Portuguese crown imposed some monopolies, as it is also
true that monopolistic systems led to the primacy of state policies in detriment of individual initiatives. But in the
Portuguese case in the 15th and 16th centuries, this monopolistic model can only be identifi ed in what concerns
the Mina gold trade and the spice trade on the Cape Run. “From the inception of the Cape trade—states James
Boyajian—its architects—the king of Portugal and the Portuguese nobility–conceived the enterprise as a royal mo-
nopoly with concession to nobles who served the king in Asia and in other military posts. Private trade in Asia was
an afterthought, and the king erected barriers to its growth. Portugal law strictly regulated embarkations in Lisbon,
the only port authorized to launch vessels bound for India.”36) This being so, a huge area of participation remained 
open for business initiative. Only the spice trade and the silver and gold trade was a monopoly of the crown. Private
entrepreneurs were able to act as intermediaries in the inter-Asian trade, and were authorised to carry in the carracks
heading for Lisbon a considerable amount of products: silks, porcelain, furniture, textiles, tapestry, precious and 
semi-precious stones, perfumes, as well as slaves for personal service—with wide possibilities of profi t.
Even the strict monopolistic policies regarding spices were not really able to totally exclude individual initia-
tives, and frequently coexisted with them. We are not referring only to smuggling, which is an illegal and parallel
fl ow of merchandise and capitals, but also to internal mechanisms authorised by the state itself which allowed the
presence of single agents in monopolistic circuits. In Portugal, in 1560, at the height the monopolistic spice trade,
only 60% of the products was handled by the crown. The other 40% was traded by individual agents, with the
crown’s permission, as has long been proved by Vitorino Magalhães Godinho37).
Something parallel seemed to happen to the ports of the Coromandel Coast in what concerns the Eastern
and Far-Eastern traffi c. It is important to keep in mind that, from the administration of Lopo Soares de Albergaria
onwards, the Bay of Bengal was an area of opportunity for merchants, mercenaries and corsairs. Even when of-
fi cial missions were intensifi ed and a fl eet was instituted to patrol this maritime space, which ceased to operate in
the 1530s, these individuals, interlopers and sometimes even outsiders were constantly active. Extortion, bribery,
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deception and piracy emerged as by-products of the Portuguese presence in the Indian Ocean, particularly in the
Bay of Bengal and the Coromandel Coast, where offi cial Portuguese control was negligible if not non-existent and 
where important shipping and trading networks intersected, linking Mylapur and Nagapattinam with Malacca38).
Observed and proved in the Coromandel Coast, these tendencies are all the more conspicuous in the case of 
trade routes in Insulindia (the maritime Southeast Asia) and the Far East. First acting as an extension of the Cape
Route and as a means of provisioning the carracks waiting for spices in Cochin, these routes gradually achieved 
autonomy, the Portuguese playing a role of intermediaries in a vast and heterogeneous inter-Asian, regional trade.
Intermediaries whose advantages included their capacity to transport large cargo loads and the heavy artillery they
carried on board which provided them with an intimidating dominion of the seas.
These agents on the move included casados (the only term applied in the sources to merchants—who are not 
acknowledged as such in the East), offi cers and missionaries travelling through a network of posts spreading from
the western coast of Africa to Japan, together with a considerable number of other informal agents, such as seafar-
ers, soldiers and adventurers, among others. The long waiting period between the arrival and the departure of the
Cape Route carracks, the fact that crews and garrisons were only paid by the time on board or during confl icts, in
addition to the delay in paying wages, increased the rates of desertion. These men were also driven by a horizon of 
opportunities offered by privateering, by missions at the service of local rulers or by promising trade opportunities
with unprecedented profi t rates.
The nobleman/merchant, the clergyman/merchant39), whether secular priest or missionary, or the sailor/
merchant, are in this context dominant socio-types. The overlapping of administrative, military, fi scal, religious or 
sailing activities with overseas trade is a historically proven fact, with numerous implications. The ultimate example
of this is the trade monopoly the Jesuits held in Japan, a matter to which we will return.
From these patterns arose the agency of powerful informal networks. Individual initiative and private interests
are paramount to understand the real dynamics of the Portuguese presence in the East, and even to fully compre-
hend the evolution of the State of India and the Portuguese decline in the East. Luís Filipe Thomaz was one of the
fi rst Portuguese historians to stress the meaningful outputs of these dynamics, in studies complemented by analyti-
cal perspectives and empirical evidence provided, among others, by Anthony Disney40) Sanjay Subrahmanyam or 
James Boyajian41).
In the East, the operation of trans-imperial and cross-border networks were undoubtedly in place. They were
inevitable to the running of the Cape Route, for the provisioning of the Armadas, depending on local markets, even
for labour force recruitment, and to guarantee what was to become even more important to the sustainability of 
Portuguese presence in the East: their role as intermediaries in inter-Asian trade. The complexity of this agency can
be found by the number of routes that, circa 1570, radiated from Goa, Malacca and Macao: twenty seven. These
included: from Goa to Hormuz, Mozambique, Ceylon, Moluccas, Coromandel, Bay of Bengal, and Malacca;
from Malacca to Siam, Macau, Japan, Burma, Moluccas, and Bandas; from Macau to Japan, Indonesia, Siam, and 
Timor42). In the quest for cinnamon, in Ceylon, cloves, in the Moluccas, nutmeg and mace from Bandas, or luxury
goods such as sandalwood from Timor, silk from China, or lacquer from Pegu, or simply as transporters of textiles,
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rice or wood, the Portuguese became mediators in a vast range of inter-cultural contacts.
3. The Portuguese in Japan. The role of the Jesuits
The presence of the Portuguese in Japan should be understood within this global framework and can be analysed 
according to these lines. The general evolution of Portuguese contact with the Japanese is well known. In 1543 the
Portuguese arrived in Japan. Two Portuguese, one of them allegedly Fernão Mendes Pinto, a trader and an adven-
turer, were passengers on a Chinese ship that landed at Tanegashima Island. The Portuguese were keen to trade
with the Japanese and they soon returned. At a time in which trade between Chinese and Japanese was affected by
confl icts and warfare due to a number of incidents involving Wokou piracy in the South China Sea, the Portuguese
soon assumed the role of intermediaries between the two territories43). The protagonism of individual agents, the
fi rst contacts mediated by third parties, in this case a Chinese crew, and the role assumed by the Portuguese as
brokers, adapting to the favourable conditions this particular juncture offered them, are all factors depicting the
functioning of informal and self-organised networks.
Besides acting as traders in the Chinese/Japanese trade, the Portuguese brought some new products to the
Japanese: tobacco, sweet potatoes, clocks and guns. The introduction of European guns was to play a major role in
Japanese internal political evolution. In a context of generalised civil war within a feudal political structure, where
power was being disputed among local landlords, expertise in handling European rifl es offered some military lead-
ers an obvious advantage. Geoffrey Parker44) showed how this factor operated a profound military revolution, as
armies rapidly established rifl e corps, able to guarantee permanent shooting. This appropriation of European rifl es
by the Japanese is further proof of individually-based dynamics of cooperation. No confrontation strategy, led by
a state, could provide the enemy with the military superiority such as that given to the Japanese through the use of 
the rifl e. The drafting of treaties on how to handle the new weapon, the ability to learn how it worked and to mass
produce it, and the development of new military tactics based on rifl e brigades, comprise key elements of an accul-
turation process and technical transfer, based on individual exchanges, contributing to a dynamics of globalisation,
not only of products and trade, but of technology and knowledge.
The namban-jin (the southern barbarians), as the Japanese called the Portuguese, centred their activity on the
island of Kyûshû, creating a business settlement in Nagasaki by 1571. The Jesuits would later be in charge of the
administration of the settlement, by decision of the local Christian landlord, Bartolomeu Sumitada. Kyûshû was a
peripheral area of Japan, far from the capital, Miyako, and less affected by the internal wars.
Its position, in relation to the Portuguese empire in Asia, was similarly peripheral, both with regard to the
headquarters of the State of India, Goa, and the major shipping routes led by the Portuguese. Located on the edge
of Eastern Asia, where offi cial Portuguese presence had not yet been established, except for Macau, the Portuguese
presence in Japan could not survive but on the basis of individual contacts, and the performance of self-organised 
networks, involving Portuguese, Chinese and Japanese merchants. Informality and adaptation were the two main
traits of the functioning of such networks, which involved the purchase of Chinese merchandise, mainly silk, at 
Cantonese fairs, their transportation to Macau and their fi nal transfer to Japan.
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Some formal structures were to be introduced in this framework by the Jesuit missions in the territory. In
1549 Jesuit missionaries led by Francis Xavier arrived in Japan, intent on to founding missions and converting the
Japanese to Christianity. Unlike the merchants, and given their mission of widespread evangelisation, their action
would ultimately have a major impact on Japan. The Jesuits sought to establish permanent missions and to spread 
throughout the Japanese territory. In 1551 Francis Xavier travelled to the capital, Miayko, trying to gain a foothold 
in Japan’s political centre45), and in 1554, Fernão Mendes Pinto, a temporary member of the Jesuits, was sent by the
Vice-Roy as an ambassador to the Daimyo of Bungo46).
The Jesuits were led to engage in the political infi ghting of Japan, a fact from which they sought to obtain the
benefi t and support of local landlords. It seemed to work, at least in the fi rst decades of the Jesuit presence, with
Christianity being accepted or at least tolerated among other confessions, and the Jesuits being able to increase
the number of their missions. The fact that by 1588 there were more than 150.000 baptised Japanese is clear as to
the success of the Jesuits’ strategy. They sought to implement in the Far East the same strategy they had followed 
in Europe and the East: the conversion of the elites, which resulted, in Japan, in the massive conversions of their 
subjects47).
With the Jesuits, religion, politics and ultimately, trade, became a structural trend, emulating, again, a well-
known shift in Portuguese overall expansion, which was meant to have a major expression in the Japanese mis-
sions.
If, at the beginning of their presence in Japan, the involvement of Jesuits in local political battles, the cir-
cumstance of a generalised civil war and the fragmentation of local powers, proved to be benefi cial to their aims
and goals, in the long run, the same strategy, added to some risky movements, taken as excessively invasive of 
the Japanese political balances and even classifi ed as acts of duplicity and treason, ended up working against the
Jesuit presence in Japan. They contributed to the fi rst anti-Christian edict, signed by Toyotomi Hideysohi in 1587,
as well as to the edict of expulsion of the Jesuits from Japan, in 1614, and ultimately to the edict of expulsion of the
Portuguese, in 1639. Again, behaviours of cooperation, deception and desertion have to be considered in order to
understand the overall framework in which the statuses of the Jesuits evolved in Japan.
During the period of the Portuguese presence, Japanese warfare was radically changed by the introduction of 
handguns and cannons, as previously noted. The victories of Oda Nobunaga are well-known. After quickly learning
how to use the new weapons, he captured the port of Sakai in 1569, and achieved a great victory at Nagashino in
1575. By the time he was assassinated, in 1582, Nobunaga controlled central Japan. Toyotomi Hideyoshi, continued 
the work of reuniting Japan. In 1587 he subdued the southern island of Kyushu and by 1590 he had also conquered 
eastern Japan. Tokugawa Ieyasu, his general, seized power and pursued the reunifi cation of Japan under strong
political and military power48).
In this new context of unifi cation, the Jesuits meant division, not only in religious terms, but also as a rising
power, politically ingenious, intellectually skilled and oriented towards their own goals. It seems that their political
manoeuvring was no longer to be tolerated by the new centralised power. Accusations of generalised persecutions
by these agents of a new confession, the Christian faith, against bonze priests, the local populations and their cus-
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toms, and the destruction of temples and idols, served as additional reasons to expel the Jesuits. The terms of their 
involvement in trade, to which we will return, only added to this animosity. Moreover, if they were useful to the
local landlords as intermediaries and brokers since their arrival to the end of 16th century, their presence became
less determinant at a time when other brokers attempted to infi ltrate in Japan, offering the same services for less
involvement. First the Spanish tried to circumvent the Portuguese; then the Dutch appeared as a serious alternative
to the monopoly of the relations performed until then by the Portuguese, both as merchants and as missionaries, if 
the two statuses could ever be distinguished in the case of the Jesuits. This leads us to the analysis of the merchant 
networks in place and the role played by the Jesuits.
Introduced by local agents, namely Chinese pilots, exploiting traditional trade channels and opening new
ones, the Portuguese, traders, adventurers, mercenaries and outsiders, penetrated a new region and contributed to
consolidating, in the second half of the 16th century, one of the most profi table and rewarding trade routes of the
time: that connecting Malacca to China and China to Japan. This traffi c, at fi rst maintained on a smuggling basis,
provided the Portuguese with a very advantageous position in the inter-Asian trade drawn by the Europeans, which
they occupied monopolistically for almost a century. Their cargo capacity and their weapons superiority, added to
the internal political circumstances in the Far East, guaranteed the Portuguese wide universes of opportunities.
Cooperation was an essential feature of this process. In fact, from the beginning, the Portuguese crossed un-
known waters with the assistance of native pilots. Let us just remember that the fi rst time the Portuguese arrived in
the Indian Ocean by sea, they were led from Sofala to Calicut by a local, Muslim pilot, Ahmad Ibn Madjid49). Arab,
Guajarati, Javanese and Malay pilots were also present on Portuguese voyages from Malabar to Ceylon, Malacca,
the Sunda Islands, Java, the Moluccas, Sumatra and Siam, much as Chinese pilots were frequently used for the
Malacca-Macau-Japan run50).
Macau was a major hub in this traffi c. Macau was, by the time of the fi rst contacts with Japan, a merchant 
republic, still uncontrolled by the Portuguese State of India. The city went quickly from being an unknown and 
marginal place to a pivotal point in the maritime trade routes of the Far East, due to the agency of individual initia-
tive. Trade dynamics were mainly created by self-organising networks led by marginal agents and outsiders of the
Portuguese empire in the East. Beginning as a hub for smuggling, Macau evolved to a merchant republic, ruled 
by the Leal Senado51), the main municipal structure, and by the authority of the Captain who ran the Goa-Macau
route. Indeed, Macau began as a territory in which the State was only represented by the Captains-General of the
Goa Route to Japan, comprising a type of mercantile republic. Only in 1623 did Macau receive a resident captain
of its own.
When Portuguese mediation between China and Japan, through Macau, gradually went beyond the status of 
an illegal, irregular, parallel circuit, to become a regular maritime trade business, the king appropriated this route
by royal provision, assigning it to noblemen, as a reward for services rendered52). Local merchants of Macau had to
negotiate the freights of their merchandise with the carrack captains, according to pre-established rates, defi ned by
the merchants’ wealth. Taken as benefi cial only to some of the richest traders, the ecclesiastic administrator of the
territories of Macau, China and Japan, Melchior Carneiro, a Jesuit himself, tried to better organise the attribution
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of freights, in the 1570’s, including the Jesuits in this proposal, as supervisors of a new model of trade, based on a
contract with fi xed amounts (the contrato de armação), in which the participation of smaller traders, as well as the
Misericordia houses and other non-lucrative institutions, like the Jesuits themselves, would be included.
Later on, identical patterns tended to be organised in Japan, in Nagasaki, to which the main cargos were
shipped, where free trade was replaced by the ‘pancada’ contract, i.e., the overall cargo of silk would be sold at a
single price, trying to avoid speculation. Again, the Jesuits, in the person of João Rodrigues Tçuzzu, became the
main regulators of this system, being João Rodrigues nominated as representative of Tokugawa Ieyasu. Mediators
between Portuguese and Japanese traders, they also acted as brokers and trade agents for the Japanese landlords.
This position would allegedly benefi t their own interests, since they were themselves involved in the trade, with
signifi cant amounts of cargos. These loads were integrated in their own shares, negotiated through third parties, and 
resulted from their position as brokers and trade agents for some of the more prominent daimyos, from which they
received silver to buy merchandise at Cantonese fairs on their behalf. It should be noted that the silver trade was
considered a crown monopoly, being illegal and totally forbidden by Portuguese royal edicts and treated as a matter 
of high treason in Macau, where religious excommunication was also imposed on the offenders. The prohibition
intended precisely to avoid increasing opportunities for smuggling by trading directly, avoiding the monopolistic
run from Macau to Japan. If we add that the Jesuits were also authorised to include extra portions of merchandise
on the carracks, due to the ‘armação’ contract, and that their shares increased signifi cantly over time, it is possible
to understand the leading position the Jesuits had in this offi cial trade.
Apart from this, in the correspondence sent to Rome and in reports by the Order’s visitors, there are allega-
tions of the Jesuits participating in a parallel trade, outside of both the yearly trade route and the ‘pancada’ system
in Japan, and it was proven that they used to sell silk in parallel markets, outside of Nagasaki, where they could 
get better prices53). Far from their formal status as representatives of the Portuguese crown and elements of the
Portuguese ‘Padroado’, they performed, in these circumstances, as informal and self-organised networks, on the
margins both of the Portuguese and the Japanese trade regulations.
With their extensive knowledge of the Japanese language, economy and markets, well connected with local
traders, belonging to a network operating within the overall Portuguese ‘Padroado’, able to obtain credit as they
did, to apply in fi nancial and commercial speculation, the Jesuits were in fact in a privileged position as brokers,
from which they took advantage, acting as traders as much as they did as missionaries.
It should be noted that their participation in this trade was both against the general principles of the ecclesiastic
status, which required vows of poverty, and against their own internal regulations. Special edicts were required,
both from the General of the Jesuit Order, in Rome, from the Pope, and from the King, in order to proceed with
the subsequent legitimation of a practice in place, highly illegal and extremely profi table. The Jesuits were able to
obtain them all, after a persistent intransigence from the General of the Order in the 1560s and 1570s. The Pope’s
sanction, which gave them formal authorization to trade between Macau and Japan, only dates from 1582, but it 
only formalised a practice that had already long been in place.
The justifi cation for this apparently exceptional status was given on the basis of a practical theology, according
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to which the benefi ts of trade were essential to their missionary activity, the offi cial funding from the Church and 
from the Crown claimed not to be suffi cient or not arriving in time to provide for the needs of an ever-growing num-
ber of foundations and Jesuit dependencies in Japan. Religion justifi ed trade. Christianisation justifi ed profi t. Their 
religious status and apparently non-profi table intention justifi ed all kind of privileges achieved by the Company,
being the Jesuits the main silk traders in the Macau/Japan maritime trade route in the 1580s.
The parallel participation of Jesuits in illegal trade, as members of the Company or as individual agents, being
involved in silver imports to Macau and China, and the delivery of cargos on illegal ships, in an underground trade
that ran parallel to the crown’s carracks, is likewise well-documented in numerous records. Besides the trade led by
the Company, allegedly run to guarantee the missions in Japan, the agency of individual Jesuits, both European and 
Japanese, should be acknowledged, within the frame of a totally illegal fl ow of merchandise and money, moving
signifi cant amounts of merchandises.
Besides this trade, another domain deserves further consideration, being the reason for repeated discussion in
the correspondence with Rome: the involvement of the Jesuits in the slave trade in Japan. A twofold perspective
seems to be in place. On the one hand, the Jesuits condemned human traffi c and even asked the Portuguese king to
prohibit the slave trade in the Portuguese settlements in the Kiûshû area, which was conceded by King Sebastian
in 1570; on the other hand, Gaspar Coelho, vice-Provincial of the Company in Japan, stated that the Jesuits were
accused of colluding with the slave trade, through the issuing of selling licenses to slave traders, ensuring, alleg-
edly with false statements, that the Japanese slaves they traded had been acquired according to the legal conditions
required54). Even if it is not proven that the Jesuits themselves were involved in human traffi c, the Company seemed 
to have indirect responsibilities in the implementation and the organisation of slave trade networks, which came to
have a wider impact on the local populations than the previous networks in place.
This intense involvement and the strong position achieved by the Jesuits in the trade circuits involving Japan
was subject to active and heated debate at the time and was strongly criticised at several levels. They were, in fact,
targeted by merchant’s criticism, the latter being affected by the Jesuits’ expertise and privileges, as much as by
local landlords blame, who used them as trade intermediaries but suspected their duplicitous behaviours. It is in
this context that the expulsion of João Rodrigues from Nagasaki in 1610, by order of the city’s Governor, should be
understood. Additionally, they had the disapproval of other ecclesiastic agents, namely other religious orders; and 
of the king himself. Philip III promulgated edicts, in 1607, 1609 and 1610, forbidding the agency of trade by the
Jesuits in Japan. However, the prohibition never had any formal effect, and was revoked by July 1611, under the
contention that the Jesuits were not provided with regular and suffi cient funding, like the other missions in the East,
being trade the main basis for the implementation of Christianisation and missionary activity in Japan55).
Regardless of the reasons, it is impossible to separate religion from trade when considering the presence of 
the Jesuits in Japan56), as much as it is diffi cult to separate formal and authorised from informal and unauthorised 
participation of Jesuits in trade circuits involving Japan. Fr. Sebastian of San Pedro, a Franciscan who wrote a
defamatory treaty on the Jesuits, explains that the Jesuits’ Nagasaki religious house was known as the customs
house and compare it to the “House of Contratación”, the same designation given in Seville to the House which
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administrated the entire Spanish trade to America under the crown ruling57).
The activities of the Jesuits in Japan shed light on another dimension of our discussion: the interference of 
trans-imperial networks in this overall framework. After the 1570s, with the regular arrival of the Manila galleons
from America, and the reinforcement of the Spanish colonial presence in the Philippines, the boundaries between
the action of Portuguese and Spanish colonisers and traders was more and more diffi cult to ascertain. If, under 
the law, no Spanish could interfere or set establishment in Portuguese settlements, the reality revealed to be quite
different. In the fi rst place, an active movement of ships was put in place connecting Manila and Macau. From
Macau, the Spanish tried to reach China, Malacca and Japan, persistently. Even if the municipal power of Macau,
the Loyal Senate, offi cially reacted against their presence, there are accounts according to which they refused to
punish Spanish captains, shipmasters or traders who had disobeyed the law. Moreover, a Castilian man, Domingos
Segurado, had obtained from a Portuguese, João da Gama, the captaincy of the carrack in charge of the Macau-
Japan route, acquiring thus jurisdiction over Macau’s subjects58).
From Macau to China and Japan, several trips were illegally organised together by Portuguese and Spanish
subjects and provisioned with mixed capital. On their way to China, these ships were trailed by British vessels, in
order to determine the maritime run to follow. Portuguese pilots were part of Japanese crews, attracted by the high
wages paid, manoeuvring ships against a policy of enclosure of the Japanese ports and maritime trade, followed by
the Japanese leaders. They did as much with Castilian ships, where they were not only sailors, but also pilots and 
captains. Multi-nationality is a permanent feature in the Asian crews and armadas, whether they were Japanese,
Chinese or European.
Macau was a hub where merchants of diverse nationalities and confessions crossed activity and business.
Repeated Castilian expeditions were organised from Manila to China and Japan, much as Portuguese expeditions
were organised heading to Manila. One of them was even put together by the captain of Cochin himself. Indeed,
this was not a marginal activity led only by outsiders of the system, but involved central personalities of the offi cial
scheme. The issue of loyalty to the Portuguese crown or the Portuguese interests is another topic under current revi-
sion. T’ien Tse Chang, in his work about Sino-Portuguese trade…59) shows how some Portuguese traders who lived 
in Japan married the daughters of prominent Japanese traders, being defenders of the Japanese trade interests rather 
than the Portuguese, in a trend which can be equally recognised in the West Coast of Africa, involving Portuguese
and local traders settled in the coast adjacent to Cap Verde.
Last but not the least, it was not only lay agents who performed active roles in the constitution and mainte-
nance of these trans-imperial and cross-border trade networks. The Castilian used mainly religious agents, able
to penetrate Portuguese settlements in Malacca, China and even in Japan60). China is a case in point: from 1575
onwards, Augustinians, Dominicans, Franciscans, and Jesuits mediated systematic efforts by the Castilians to pen-
etrate this territory, and to initiate trade relations, with immediate reactions from the Portuguese traders, Portuguese
representatives and Portuguese clergy61). We should not forget that the king was by that time the same one, under 
the dynastic union between Spain and Portugal, during the period between 1580 and 1640.
The analysis of the Jesuits performance in Japan has necessarily to consider a third relevant topic, besides poli-
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tics and trade: the Jesuits’ missionary activity and acculturation processes in Japan. We do not intend to thoroughly
review the evangelisation strategies followed by the Jesuits, or analyse their acculturation processes62). However,
we could not disregard another kind of networking: the individual interacts that took place between the European
Jesuits and the Japanese Jesuits as brothers and as auxiliary personnel of the Jesuit missions. This leads to another 
area of research, interculturality, which is an additional dimension of globalisation.
The abovementioned specifi city of the Jesuit mission in Japan, its uniqueness with regard to the main centres
of authority of the Portuguese empire in the East; its sporadic contacts with the Portuguese merchants coming from
Macau once a year; its marginality regarding the main epicentres of evangelisation, its peculiar status within the
Portuguese ‘Padroado’ in the East—all worked together to make the Jesuits mainly dependent on the internal condi-
tions provided by Japan itself. This circumstance raised a number of problems in the process, along with signifi cant 
advantages, since the missionary activity of the Jesuits was not associated with a foreign political power intent on
imposition over Japan.
The Jesuits depended thus, simultaneously, on the protection and welfare of the daimyos and on cooperation
and assistance from local agents. In what concerns evangelisation there was a twofold strategy in place: the adop-
tion of the Buddhist system of the “dógicos” or dojucus, who acted, not as priests, since they did not take vows,
but as co-operators, as assistants even in the domain of catechisation; and the formation of an indigenous clergy, by
the admission of Japanese as members to the Company. Their number, in both cases, increased over time, and the
dependency of the European Jesuits on these elements became crucial to the mission’s sustainability63).
The decision to enforce the constitution of a local clergy was constantly under scrutiny and debate. From the
correspondence and reports, it seems clear that, while European Jesuits in Japan defended actively that position,
it had strong reaction from the institutionalised hierarchy in Europe, namely in Rome. The massive establishment 
of a local clergy was still exceptional in the overall framework of the Portuguese ‘Padroado’, mostly regarding the
Jesuits, whose selection criteria was, even in Europe, very strict.
The need to follow a different policy in Japan increased from 1587 onwards and particularly in 1614, when
the European missionaries were expelled. By then, the Jesuits understood that the maintenance of Christianity in
Japan depended on the activity of the indigenous priests: the number of ordinations then increased, even though the
Jesuits would often return, disguised as merchants and sailors, to their previous domain of activity64).
Although the Jesuits admitted and implemented the ordinations of local priests, and depended on a signifi cant 
number of “dógicos” or dojucus in their activity, it is however clear that a sense of criticism toward these members,
a certain degree of incomprehension of their habits and a permanent claim as to their lack of discipline and obedi-
ence prevailed in the Jesuit letters. An unavoidable Eurocentric position and incomprehension of the daily habits
and psychological profi le of the local collaborators is present in the majority of the letters, mostly from 1580s
onwards. However, there are other statements that project a sense of superiority on part of the Japanese, parallel to
the clear admission that the European Jesuits depended on them, both for evangelisation, for cultural contacts and 
for political relations, because of their knowledge of the language, the culture and the local political balances.
In 1551 Cosme de Torres, in a letter to his confreres in Goa, stated enthusiastically that “The Japanese belong
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to one of the most intelligent people in the world. They are superior to us because they respect reason with joy. […]
The Europeans consider themselves as educated people. However, when compared to the Japanese, we seem quite
savage. I have to admit that the Japanese teach me many things everyday. I believe that there are no other people in
the world with so many innate skills”65). In 1587 Pedro Ramon, another Jesuit priest, wrote, in a different context:
“…I have dealt with them already for ten years and each day I am more surprised and I state (if one can make this
comparison without being odious), that these people here are much better than in Europe, and this without a shadow
of doubt”66). This is not, however, the prevalent vision at a time in which persecution of the Jesuits was already in
place, even if still at a reversible stage.
The “acomodatio” concept, which expresses a policy toward the total integration of the Japanese indigenous
priests in the Company, did not seem to really happen: on the contrary, a sense of superiority by the European
priests, the diffi culty of the local ones to accede to higher positions in the hierarchy, formal claims, and the use of 
political plays by the Japanese priests, in order to circumvent the diffi culties felt in the missions, using political
pressure to achieve their aims, serve to prove some internal tension. The repeated written testimonies refl ect, once
again, the overall mechanisms of cooperation at hand: behaviours of collaboration, deception and duplicity were
in place on a daily basis. The frequent abandonment of the mission, both by dojucus and Japanese priests, is an
evident sign of lack of accommodation67).
Interculturality worked in fact in both ways, and seemed to be more effective with regard to the European
Jesuits: acculturation was a major trend in the presence of the Jesuits in Japan, and it was inevitable. They tended 
to adapt to the local environment in ways incomprehensible to all of the Company’s European visitors. The later 
were even to doubt who were the converted: if the Japanese to Christianity, or the Jesuits to the Japanese culture.
Language, food regime, architectural models of the Jesuit houses and churches; clothes; daily schedules; the
nature of self-punishment and corporal punishments toward third parties68): all seemed to be more Japanese than
European69).
Summing up, some ideas could be highlighted.
In the fi rst place, globalisation is a complex and multidimensional process, which, nevertheless, in its eco-
nomic, cultural, ethnical, linguistic, and even environmental implications, has more to do with the activities of 
individual agents crossing all kind of frontiers: linguistic, cultural, geographical, political, religious, rather than with
the functioning of national empires. Globalisation is based on cooperation, while formal empires present themselves
more disposed to imposition mechanisms. Unless one accepts and acknowledges the persistent informal ways of 
empire building, which frequently ran against the empires themselves, empires had little to do with globalisation
processes.
In the second place, mechanisms of globalisation can be much better apprehended and understood if one
looks at the other side of the mirror, and searches for the functioning of mechanisms of cooperation (which in-
volved also ways of deception, desertion and competition) operating among informal networks of individuals. In
these networks, authority and verticality are much more fl uid than in formal structures, and communication fl ows
persisted, crossing frontiers, even against the formal and institutionalised rules that those agents were expected to
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comply with.
Thirdly, the Portuguese overseas expansion as a whole is quite expressive of the ways in which individual
agents and self-organised networks worked in favour of the building and maintenance of a polyhedral overseas
empire. They were even essential to that construction, whose path sometimes followed crown policies and desid-
eratum, sometimes refl ected their own goals, aims and strategies. Understanding the Portuguese empire building
and collapse implies understanding the manner in which those agents interacted within and outside the borders of 
the formal empire.
Last, but not the least, the case study of the Jesuits in Japan gives us the ultimate example of how these net-
works operated and interacted in the First Global Age. Offi cial agents both of the church and the Portuguese crown,
the Jesuits operated by themselves, in an adaptive process in which their decisions and strategies had more to do
with Japanese and East Asian constrains, demands and opportunities, rather than with the offi cial framework of a
faraway Portuguese eastern empire or the Catholic ecumenism. Religion, politics and trade were inextricable do-
mains of individual agency. With the Jesuits, missionary activities, as well as political and economic performances,
have to be understood in the framework of different networks, including Portuguese, Japanese, and Chinese, both
lay and ecclesiastical, intermingled in a disentangled way. Processes of imposition, negotiation, and adaptation
weave a web of global interactions between European, Japanese and other Asian peoples, on which thorough re-
fl ection and research is essential to more fully understand the dynamic, open, complex, non-linear system which
characterised the First Global Age.
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